

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED NATIONS

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Soviet interest in a United Nations began early in the war. Stalin and Molotov issued the first public announcement when they met with General Sikorski, President of the Council of Ministers of Poland and Commander-in-Chief of Polish forces, to discuss the future relationships of their countries. In their declaration of December 3, 1941¹ they went beyond the question of the relations of their two governments to consider post-war organization. They stated, "After the victorious war and the punishment of the Hitlerite criminals, the task of the Allied Governments will be the securing of permanent and just peace. This can be achieved only through a new organization of international relations, based on the unification of democratic countries in a permanent union. In creating such an organization, the decisive factor must be respect for international law, supported by the cooperative military strength of all Allied Governments."

The Soviet Union in this statement indicated its readiness to share in international organization after the war. British Foreign Minister Eden grasped the opportunity and traveled to Moscow to discuss the matter further. In a joint British-Soviet communique, issued on December 29, 1941, it was reported that "the exchange of opinion on the question of post-war organization of the world and safety brought forward much important and useful material which in the future will aid the possibility of working out a concrete proposal in this sphere."² Three days later, on January 1, 1942, Ambassador Litvinov signed in Washington the Declaration of the United Nations on behalf of the Soviet Government. The U.S.S.R. had become officially one of the family of nations accepting the program of purposes and principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter as the basis for post-war plans.

Outsiders are usually presumptuous when they pretend to know how any country formulates its foreign policy. The presumption is especially great when the country in issue is the U.S.S.R. Soviet leaders maintain a disciplined reserve in discussing what occurs in Soviet policy-making bodies. There is no group of officials prepared to communicate to the press the "inside" story from which foreign students can draw conclusions. With full realization of the difficulty involved,

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1. See 1 VNESHNAYA POLITIKA SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA V PERIOD OTECHESTVENNOI VOINY (1944) 169.

2. *Id.* at 170.

this paper has been prepared because it seems obvious that Americans must try to understand the outlook of other major powers if there is to be a workable plan for peace. In the absence of a complete record, conclusions must be based upon those facts which are known, even though they are patently insufficient for a full analysis.

THE RUSSIAN HERITAGE

Confusion can be caused by calling international society a "family of nations." Even in a family in which there is a common bond of parents, environment, education and historical tradition, there are likely to be differing points of view. In the international sphere the differences are sharper, particularly when one moves from the western world to the eastern world. To understand any country's approach to life, one must know its heritage. This maxim applies with unusual force to Americans who would understand the Soviet Union, for they have shared very few of the experiences which have been common to the peoples who live in the U.S.S.R. and to the leaders who direct its policy.

First and foremost the American must appreciate that when he seats himself at an international conference table with a Soviet colleague, he is to share thoughts with a man who is in most cases of recent peasant origin. Old Russia was a land of peasants. The census of 1783 showed that 94.5% of the male population was rural.³ Of this number only 7% were freemen, the rest being serfs upon private estates or crown lands. Not until 1861 were the serfs freed, and even then economic and cultural bonds continued to maintain the serf mentality for nearly fifty years. Industry developed slowly in the Russian Empire. In 1865 there were only 700,000 workmen in factories, mines, on the railroads and elsewhere. By 1890 the total had risen to only 1,400,000 workmen, and these were largely in the big cities.⁴

A peasant background has a lasting effect upon a nation, particularly when it is combined with a tradition of serfdom, which carried with it illiteracy upon a national scale. Americans familiar with mountain people or the colored people of the South can testify to the cautious approach of the illiterate to the educated. In such circumstances, characteristics described as inscrutable are a commonplace. These and the added characteristic of apparent deviousness are dominant among such people. The eminent Russian historian of the last century,

3. KORNILOV, *MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY* (Kaun's trans. 1943) 26.

4. See *HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, SHORT COURSE* (1939) 5. Cf. KNORIN, *COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, A SHORT HISTORY* (1935) 5, placing the 1890 figure at 2,400,000. To the same general effect see VERNADSKY, *A HISTORY OF RUSSIA* (1929) 195. "In the beginning of the twentieth century, the majority of Russian workers were still connected with the peasantry. They were in fact peasants temporarily engaged in factory work."

V. O. Kluchevsky, has given a picture of the character of the Russian peasant in these words:⁵ "By some observers he is accused of lack of straightforwardness and sincerity. That is a mistake. True, he often takes two views of a question, but this seeming double-mindedness arises from the fact that, though his mental process leads him to make straight for his goal (ill-considered though the goal often be), he does so looking to either side of him as he goes, even as his ancestors scanned the surrounding fastnesses which they were forced to traverse. 'Beware lest thou strike thy forehead against a wall; none but crows fly straight,' says a Great Russian proverb. Circumstances and the forces of nature have combined to teach the native of Great Russia to try all roads when making for a given point, and to think and act as he goes along."

It is this Russian peasant who has often been called upon to fight for his land and home and to keep open its contacts with the rest of the world. The experience has left a lasting impression upon him and developed what might be called a security obsession. America has no comparable experience to the three "wars for the fatherland" of 1812, 1914 and 1941 through which the Russian peasant has suffered. America with its long coastlines on both major oceans has no tradition such as Peter the Great's wars with Sweden to clear a way to the Baltic or Catherine the Great's incessant wars with Poland and Turkey to assure a foothold in the west and south from which to maintain communication with the culture of the more advanced west. America's Civil War was disastrous for the South and of extensive consequence to the entire nation, but it cannot be compared with the impression made upon the whole Russian people by the Civil War following World War I. Not only was this a Civil War, but it was a war of intervention by nearly all major countries of the world. Attack came from the north, east, west and south. Persia and Poland, Manchuria and Murmansk proved to be the routes of the invaders. The security obsession became centered on specific areas, which were regarded with special interest as being as important to national defense as the U.S.S.R.'s own territory. In this instance the security obsession was more firmly fixed than it would have been if the events had not been recent. The senior generation of contemporary Soviet leaders lived through this period. Some of them, like Stalin and Voroshilov, had personal experience in stopping the invaders after World War I. These same men, as well as millions of their more youthful contemporaries, saw the experience repeated during World War II in many of the same places.

THE MARXIST REVOLUTIONARY BACKGROUND

Soviet leaders approach their problems not only with historical traditions but with political convictions. All have been trained in

5. See 1 KLUCHEVSKY, *A HISTORY OF RUSSIA* (Hogarth's trans. 1911) 220.

Marxist thought. Most of the senior leaders began studying Marx in the underground schools which arose in Russia at the opening of this century. Others joined the leadership later, but not without a thorough grounding in Marxist fundamentals, as applied to post-World War I situations by Lenin and his colleagues.

Marxist thought teaches that a new form of economic and social structure is to follow capitalism. It is believed that this new form will be more productive, and, therefore, more desirable for the majority of the peoples of the world. As the new form develops, the leaders of present-day capitalist society are expected to lose wealth and power. Soviet leaders assume that such a future cannot appeal to the leaders of capitalist society and that they will do everything they can to prevent such an eventuality. While efforts to stem the tide will begin at home, Soviet leaders expect them to go beyond the internal scene. They think it would be remarkable if capitalist leaders did not eventually turn their attention to the international scene, fighting first among themselves to obtain markets and therefore to bolster up their own position in their own immediate environment.⁶ When this has failed, as Soviet leaders feel that it must, because of what Marxists believe to be the contradictions inherent in a capitalist economy, the leaders of capitalist society are expected to look elsewhere for a solution. The "elsewhere" is expected by Soviet leaders to take the form of an attempt to eradicate the principal source of Marxist teaching, namely the U.S.S.R.⁷ This eventuality is expected with even greater certainty because Soviet leaders anticipate confidently that their system of economy will progress so that it will ultimately compare more than favorably with the capitalist system, which Soviet leaders expect will decline in a series of recurring economic depressions.

Soviet leaders feel that their reason to expect opposition from abroad, based on political and economic theory, can be substantiated by more than theoretical hypotheses. They point to the period of intervention after World War I, to which reference has already been made. They find sufficient evidence in Clemenceau's policy of a *cordon sanitaire*

6. "The fact is, that the unevenness of development of the capitalist countries usually leads in time to violent disturbance of equilibrium in the world system of capitalism; that group of capitalist countries which considers itself worse provided than others with raw materials and markets usually makes attempts to alter the situation and repartition the 'spheres of influence' in its favor by armed force. The result is a splitting of the capitalist world into two hostile camps and war between them." Speech delivered by J. V. Stalin at a Meeting of Voters of the Stalin Electoral Area of Moscow, February 9, 1946. See EMBASSY OF THE U.S.S.R., INFORMATION BULL. (Spec. Supp., Mar. 1946) 3.

7. "Developing peaceful socialist construction, we should not forget for a single minute the intrigues of international reaction, which is hatching plans for a new war." Stalin, *Order of the Day*, May 1, 1946 in EMBASSY OF THE U.S.S.R. INFORMATION BULL. (May 9, 1946) 363.

and in Winston Churchill's recurring criticism to prove to their own satisfaction that hostility can be expected on ideological grounds.

Americans, particularly at the level of the college graduate, are so accustomed to searching endlessly for truth that they often fail to appreciate that Marxist thought has been accepted unquestioningly as the means of explaining social events by a large segment of European society, and particularly by Soviet leaders. This acceptance bears sharply upon the determination of Soviet policy. It tends to compound the suspicion of the Western World which has grown out of the Russian heritage. It tends to develop the passion for security to a point where many Americans cannot believe it genuine, particularly if they are unfamiliar with Marxist principles.

Marxists are not only security-conscious. They also have something in them of the missionary. Like the French Revolutionaries after the beheading of their King, they believe they have an experience worth sharing with mankind. This concept is not unfamiliar to Americans who have been known for their self-confidence and their preparedness to advise others that their ills would be cured if they would adopt the American system of life. A sense of exhilaration swept many an American heart when the Chinese Emperor was deposed in 1911 and when Tsar Nicholas II abdicated in 1917. Americans believe the world would prosper under the constitutional democracy with which they have so long been familiar. Tolerance of other systems which has come with a measure of maturity has not dulled the interest in the spread of the American way of life, but has only reduced the extent to which the nation will go to see that it is spread.

Soviet leaders have learned from Marxist classics that the progress of historical development is bound eventually to bring the world to the socialist organization of economy, and ultimately to communism. At the same time this development is not even. Some areas are expected to progress faster than others. During the period of retardation the peoples who progress slowly may enjoy a considerable measure of wealth and freedom; yet it is expected that this will always be less than is potentially possible. For this reason those who have progressed farthest towards the society believed to be the most desirable are thought to have a special obligation to guide, and to aid, if possible, progress along the long and difficult road. In this concept lies the missionary feeling of Soviet leaders. It becomes of more immediate concern when it can be associated with the security of the U.S.S.R. by offering the possibility of developing governments in neighboring countries which could be expected to be friendly to, if not a part of, the U.S.S.R., and thus of expanding its defense potential in any conflict with governments seeking to annihilate, or at least restrain it.

"Revolution is not for export" was a favorite slogan of Soviet leaders before World War II. By this they meant that conditions must be

such within a country as to give rise to revolution, or the insurgents cannot be expected to make use of foreign support to hold power. It would not be possible to impose a revolutionary change from outside. This theory was demonstrated during the winter war with Finland in 1940-1941 when the Terioki Government under the Finnish Communist Leader, Otto Kuusinen, attempted to establish a revolutionary government to obtain Finnish support, but without success. Finland could be defeated but not revolutionized. On the other hand there arose in Germany and Hungary after World War I local revolutionary groups which succeeded in gaining power, but they could not retain it because the opposition at home and from abroad was too powerful to resist successfully. The new Soviet government of the Russian Republic was in no position to give military assistance, and Soviet leaders watched the annihilation of the movements in which they had such hopes.

Soviet missionary thinking must find its outlet between the failure in Hungary where there was a local movement and no military support from abroad and the failure in Finland where there was military support from abroad but no sufficiently developed local movement which could gain power within.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Suspicion of international organization was characteristic of Soviet policy during the early years of Soviet existence. Litvinov once said that the Soviet Government considered the League of Nations "not a friendly assimilation of peoples working for the common benefit, but as a masked union of the so-called great powers who have arrogated to themselves the right of dictating the fate of weaker peoples."⁸ Soviet leaders never believed the statesmen of other lands who spoke of the League in terms of the parliament of man. They examined the Versailles Treaty from which it sprang and concluded that this was a document of power politics. Professor E. A. Korovin characterized the Versailles Treaty in these terms in his wartime textbook on International Law.⁹ He took the position that the treaty created boundaries based not on the interest of the mass but on the interest of definite imperialist blocs; reparations fell not on German imperialist plutocracy who were largely responsible for the war, but on the broad masses of the toiling population; and the promissory notes given the workers, such as the I.L.O., were pure demagoguery, concealing attempts of the imperialist powers to build up a united front of capitalist countries for the annihilation of Soviet Russia and the liquidation of the achievements of the Revolution. The League as the creature and defender of

8. Ivanov, *Liga Natsii* in II ENCYC. GOSUDARSTVA I PRAVA (1930) 755.

9. Korovin, *Kratkii Kurs Mezhdunarдного Prava, Chast II Pravo Voiny* (1944) 25-26.

the treaty seemed unfriendly to Soviet leaders, who had faced its major supporters on the battlefield during the period of intervention.

It was years before the Soviet leaders permitted themselves to change their views as to the desirability of participation in the League's activities. It seems unlikely that they ever changed their views as to the character of the League as an instrument of power politics and as an agency which was essentially hostile to the U.S.S.R. Litvinov once said, "Only an angel could be unbiased in judging Russian affairs."¹⁰ Later statements never showed any expectation that the U.S.S.R. could bring itself to anticipate an impartial decision from the League or any of its agencies.

Some foreign statesmen reached the conclusion that Soviet thinking on the subject of the League had changed when it accepted an invitation to join in 1934. The record hardly supports such a conclusion. The Soviet Union did not act until Japan and Germany had withdrawn and until the *anschluss* between Austria and Germany had frightened France to the point where she turned her full attention to preventing the further rise of Hitler's power. Stalin surveyed the situation with Walter Duranty in response to the question whether the Soviet position towards the League would always be negative. In responding "No, not always and not under all conditions," Stalin continued, ". . . the League may become a sort of brake to hold back the development of military activities or to prevent them. If this is so, if the League can offer itself as a sort of hillock on such a path, so as to make somehow warfare more difficult and to facilitate to some extent peace, then we shall not be against the League . . . in spite of its colossal shortcomings."¹¹

It can be seen that the U.S.S.R. began collaboration with the Western Democracies with considerable reservations and for the purpose of furthering her own immediate program of preventing war. She took an active part in the League's program of sanctions against Italy in 1935 and in its other activities, pressing regularly for more vigorous measures to prevent war. When the Spanish Civil War demonstrated that Mussolini and Hitler were immune from League action, the U.S.S.R., apparently having determined that international cooperation had failed, took an active part in aiding the Spanish Government against Franco. The U.S.S.R. thereafter relied on bilateral pacts and its own ingenuity and strength to keep war from its own borders. Finally it was expelled from the League at the end of 1940 because of its war against Finland. To Soviet leaders this act seemed based upon anti-Soviet hostility, for Japan, Germany and Italy had escaped expulsion. The League, in Soviet opinion, rose to action only against them and

10. TARACOUZIO, *THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW* (1935) 296.

11. KOLSKII, *LIGA NATSIH (EE ORGANIZATSIYA I DEYATELNOST)* (1935) 5.

showed its character as an anti-Soviet instrument rather than an anti-war instrument.¹²

Soviet experience with the League has been studied carefully by its leaders. Participation in the United Nations has been governed by efforts to avoid the situations which plagued Soviet policy in the League.

PREPARATIONS FOR A UNITED NATIONS

The U.S.S.R. participated with the United States and the United Kingdom at the Moscow Conference in October, 1943. General outlines of the new world organization were discussed and the basic principle set forth in a communique issued on October 30 by the three powers, together with China. This was to the effect "that they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security."¹³ Thereafter the U.S.S.R. set about preparing for a conference to discuss the new organization.¹⁴ A Soviet writer, N. Malinin, early put forth the principle of great power leadership to which the U.S.S.R. has consistently adhered in all subsequent discussions.¹⁵ He also explained that it would be naive to suppose that the powers joining an international organization would forsake their special national interests. He found it possible to expect the creation of a system in which states joining the organization and defending their own interests would also defend the general international interests of securing peace and preventing aggression.

The Dumbarton Oaks discussions were held behind closed doors, and no record has been published from which an indication of the particular Soviet interests can be gleaned. Apparently, the Soviet Union accepted the results without feeling that any principles which they believed important had been overlooked or lost. Stalin issued a statement in which he said, "A characteristic of this conference was the fact, not that some disagreement was disclosed, but that nine-tenths of the questions concerning security were decided at this conference in the spirit of complete unanimity."¹⁶ The only question on which agreement remained to be reached was that relating to a voting procedure. The U.S.S.R. hoped for the establishment of a principle

12. *O Mezhdunarodnoi Organizatsii Bezopasnosti* (Oct. 15, 1944) *VOINA I RABOCHII KLASS*.

13. TOWARD THE PEACE—DOCUMENTS (U. S. Dep't State 1945) No. 2298, at 6.

14. Levin, *O Mezhdunarodnoi Organizatsii Bezopasnosti* (1945) *IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK SSSR, OTDELENIE EKONOMIKI I PRAVA* No. 1, at 5.

15. Malinin, *Mezhdunarodnaya Organizatsiya Bezopasnosti* (Apr. 1944) *ZVEZDA*.

16. Levin, *op. cit. supra* note 14, at 5.

requiring unanimity of the great powers in the decisions of the Security Council. This was argued for by the U.S.S.R. on the basis of the experience of the League of Nations, to the effect that sanctions cannot do more than start another world war unless the great powers are in accord in their application. The U.S.S.R. argued that if one of the great powers was a party to a dispute, it should not be excluded from voting.¹⁷ Formal agreement was reached on the voting question at the Crimean Conference in February 1945. The U.S.S.R. has consistently adhered to its point of view since that time, and has reasserted it on numerous occasions, as will be seen below.

As the San Francisco Conference drew near, a Soviet writer expressed his concern over the French refusal to sponsor the conference, particularly since the French stated that they feared there was some inconsistency between the Franco-Soviet Pact, which DeGaulle had concluded in December 1944, and the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.¹⁸ The Soviet view was that this treaty and the Soviet-British and Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaties which had preceded it could only be regarded as a special form of promotion of the organization's aims. It was stated that it might be argued that inasmuch as the international organization undertakes to suppress all aggression, bilateral treaties are superfluous. To this argument the response was advanced that the melancholy experience of the League of Nations which set itself just such aims was all too fresh in memories. It was stated that the new organization might avoid the defects of the League, but the peoples of Europe had suffered too much from the war to found their security on hopes, and they dared not neglect any supplementary guarantees for their safety. Experience was called upon to prove that individual obligations of individual states in respect to allied assistance are observed to a greater degree and more rapidly than obligations assumed under collective agreements.

The Act of Chapultepec of March 3, 1945 raised sharp doubts in Soviet minds. While the U.S.S.R. had encouraged bilateral pacts in addition to the world organization, it felt differently about regional pacts. The various proposals of regional groupings, which had issued from Western European professors and statesmen, had evoked suspicion.¹⁹ Chapultepec was further cause for concern. The U.S.S.R. indicated that it could understand that the new international organization did not exclude the possibility of cooperation of states to preserve peace and preserve special interests in a given region, but the U.S.S.R. opposed any extension of these groupings into blocs directed against the

17. *Id.* at 13-14.

18. Nikolayev, *France and the San Francisco Conference* (Mar. 15, 1945) *WAR AND THE WORKING CLASS* 9.

19. Levin, *op. cit. supra* note 14, at 5.

unanimity of the great powers.²⁰ One Soviet writer had suggested that for administrative purposes the new world organization might be divided into four sections, European, American, Asiatic-Pacific and African, but this would not be a bloc since the subdivisions would not be separated from the main organization but would be an integral, although regionally specialized, part.²¹

The Soviet position at San Francisco was maintained along the same lines as the pre-Conference discussion. Molotov opened his government's participation by stating, "The Soviet Government is a sincere and firm champion of the establishment of a strong international organization of security. Whatever may depend upon it and its efforts in the common cause of the creation of such a postwar organization for peace and security of nations, will readily be done by the Soviet Government."²² Eleven days later Molotov again expressed his confidence that the Conference would work out the principal problems.²³ He summarized the Soviet position as it had developed in the opening days. He had taken vigorous issue with the admission of the Argentine because he felt that there had not been time to study the situation to see whether the Argentine had abandoned its fascist policies. He said that the issue was not whether the U.S.S.R. had diplomatic relations with a country, but whether the Argentine position as an aid to the enemy had changed. He also linked the question to the refusal of the Conference to admit the Provisional Government of Poland, which the U.S.S.R. had been supporting.

The chapter on "Purposes" in the draft Charter was praised by Molotov because it spoke of self-determination, equality and justice which he believed would draw the particular attention of the populations of colonies and mandated territories. He favored the inclusion of a program of human rights and fundamental freedoms as indicating the incompatibility of the organization with membership of fascist countries. He regretted that the program of human rights did not include reference to the right to work and the right to education. He opposed any effort to provide that the organization should examine all outstanding treaties for compatibility with the organization, as violating the sovereign rights of the signatory states. He praised the solution of the relationship between bilateral treaties of mutual assistance with the organization and the preservation of the principle of the requirement of unity among the great powers and the special posi-

20. *Id.* at 13.

21. Malinin, *K Voprosu o Sozdanii Mezhdunarodnoi Organizatsii Bezopasnosti* (Dec. 15, 1945) *VOINA I RABOCHII KLASS*.

22. Molotov, *Speeches and Statement at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco* in *EMBASSY OF THE U.S.S.R. INFORMATION BULL.* (Spec. Supp., May 24, 1945) 7.

23. *Id.* at 13.

tion of the Security Council. He spoke for further consideration of the trusteeship principle so as to see to it that dependent countries are enabled as soon as possible to take the path of national independence.

Molotov's review made it clear that the U.S.S.R. would countenance no change in the requirement that unity of the great powers was to be required in matters of substance; that former enemy states or their supporters would not be admitted until after careful scrutiny; that Soviet bilateral security arrangements must be left unmolested; and that the organization offered an excellent tribune through which the colonial and dependent peoples might be reached and supported in their progress.

In commenting on the work of the Conference, one Soviet writer²⁴ raised again the efforts of the small states to weaken the role of the great powers and to reduce the United Nations to the powerless position of the League of Nations. He repeated the U.S.S.R.'s opposition to exclusion of a permanent member of the Security Council from voting in cases in which it was directly interested. He also criticized the efforts of some delegations, especially the small powers, to support the principle of compulsory jurisdiction for the International Court of Justice and the use of compulsion to enforce its decisions.²⁵ He praised the plan to have the new Court discuss matters threatening the peace, rather than small claims of one state against another.²⁶

THE FIRST MEETINGS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

With the signing of the Charter on June 26, 1945 and its ultimate ratification by all signatories,²⁷ the preparatory organizations began their work. Discussions in these organizations have not been published, but the results have appeared in various reports.²⁸ The U.S.S.R., apparently, was conciliatory in the work of organization, although it had definite ideas on which it spoke vigorously. In one of the few reported debates, Ambassador Gromyko said, "I wish to say that the Soviet Government has a definite negative attitude towards Geneva as a possible place for the United Nations Organization. The Soviet Government considers that the United States would be the proper

24. Levin, *Ustav Obedinennykh Natsii* (1945) *IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK SSSR, OTDELENIE EKONOMIKI I PRAVA* No. 5, at 24.

25. *Id.* at 26.

26. *Id.* at 27.

27. The U.S.S.R. ratified on Aug. 20, 1945. The Charter of the U. N. and Statute of the International Court, together with the Soviet ratification, have been published in an edition of 50,000 copies by the State Publishing House for Political Literature, Moscow, 1945.

28. See REPORT BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE TO THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION OF THE U. N., PREPARATORY COMMISSION OF THE U. N. (London, 1945) and REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FIRST PART OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE U. N., LONDON, Dep't of State Pub. No. 2484.

place for the United Nations Organization. The United States is located conveniently between Asia and Europe. The old world has had it once, and it is time for the new world to have it." ²⁹

The first General Assembly, brought into session on January 10, 1946, presented the U.S.S.R. with an opportunity to speak publicly. Ambassador Gromyko took sharp issue with the procedure followed in electing a President of the session of the General Assembly. He had made a nominating speech for the Foreign Minister of Norway,³⁰ but his candidate, although the only one nominated, was defeated by a man whose name had not even been mentioned publicly before the ballots were counted. Gromyko later indicated his disapproval of lobbying methods off the floor of the session which had made this surprise election possible. He again took issue with precipitous elections in connection with the selection of non-permanent members of the Security Council, saying that there should be time for discussion and consultation.³¹ Later in the session when the question of nominations was considered in detail, Gromyko stated, "No vital interests of the Soviet delegation are involved here," but he felt that candidates might be unknown to some of the members and that nominating speeches were in order. His American colleague agreed that, although the custom had been greatly abused in the United States, it seemed the desirable one.³²

Manuilsky, speaking for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, also argued against lobbying outside the meeting rather than discussions inside,³³ and expressed the opinion that public nominations would lessen the possibility of the formation of blocs. The debate was hot, but the U.S.S.R., its republics and the United States were voted down in favor of Lebanon's motion, supported by the United Kingdom, that public discussion of candidates would restrict complete freedom.³⁴

A second major debate arose over the participation of the World Federation of Trade Unions in the work of the General Assembly. This organization, which had been brought into being in 1945 and had tried unsuccessfully, even with Soviet support, to be heard at San Francisco, sought a place at meetings of the General Assembly and participation in the work of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Kuznetsov, of the U.S.S.R. (who is chairman of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions of the U.S.S.R. and its delegate on the W.F.T.U.), urged the General Committee to accept the W.F.T.U.'s proposal.³⁵

29. REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, *supra* note 28, at 124.

30. JOURNAL OF THE GEN. ASSEMBLY (Jan. 11, 1946) 26-27.

31. *Id.* (Jan. 14, 1946) 62, 67.

32. *Id.* (Jan. 28, 1946) 326-28.

33. *Id.* (Jan. 28, 1946) 328.

34. *Id.* (Jan. 28, 1946) 336.

35. *Id.* (Jan. 16, 1946) 136.

He was supported by Manuilsky and by Gromyko, who asked that representatives of the W.F.T.U. be present at the meeting of the General Committee when the request was discussed.³⁶ He was outvoted in this proposal, and the General Committee prepared its report.

When the report was presented on the W.F.T.U., it was explained that Gromyko had urged that the W.F.T.U. have the right to speak in the General Assembly, however the right might be described. When no agreement was reached, the question was referred to the General Assembly.³⁷ Gromyko restated the Soviet position, but it was accepted only in part, for the final resolution agreed to admit the W.F.T.U. and the American Federation of Labor to the Economic and Social Council in a consultative capacity. The Soviet proposal that the W.F.T.U. be at least invited to attend meetings of the General Assembly as an official guest was rejected.

Resolutions on the work of the Economic and Social Council evoked Soviet comment. The U.S.S.R. voted for the recommendations of the Sixth Committee on provisional rules of procedure to permit ECOSOC to summon international conferences, especially on international trade and employment, the equitable adjustment of prices on the international market, and public health.³⁸ On the other hand Manuilsky argued against having ECOSOC deal with statements of human rights, on the ground that the questions were not ripe for discussion.³⁹ This same desire for delay appeared in the first session of ECOSOC at which the Soviet Delegate Vasily A. Sergeëv (one of the Soviet Vice Ministers of Foreign Trade) expressed his feeling that it was too early to call a health conference in 1946, because there were many other conferences scheduled and because countries might not be in a position to make a sufficiently comprehensive study of all the aspects of the health problem.⁴⁰ The Ukrainian delegate, Tarasenko, who had earlier supported

36. *Id.* (Jan. 23, 1946) 279.

37. *Id.* (Jan. 31, 1946) 360.

38. *Id.* (Jan. 30, 1946) 349-50.

39. *Id.* (Jan. 15, 1946) 98. When the Report of the Commission on Human Rights was presented to ECOSOC, the Soviet delegate, Borisov, who arrived late, was indicated as wishing it to be recorded that he had not yet been able to study sufficiently the records of the meetings of the Commission and the various documents and preferred to abstain from voting on the question of regional conferences and the provisions for implementation. He also requested that he be recorded as disagreeing with the recommendation that all members should serve as non-governmental representatives. He expressed the view that all members of the Commission on Human Rights should be appointed as government representatives in the same way as members of ECOSOC. See JOURNAL OF ECOSOC (May 24, 1946) 161, 162, 164, 165, 167, 168.

40. See JOURNAL OF ECOSOC (Feb. 15, 1946) 90. No Soviet citizen was a delegate to the meetings of the Technical Preparatory Committee for the International Health Conference in Paris, March 18-April 5, 1946. *Id.* (May 22, 1946) 155-6. Soviet delegates appeared, however, at the organizational meeting of the World Health Organization in June-July, 1946 and actively supported organization.

the Chinese resolution to call an international health conference with a suggestion that the question be studied for submission to the next meeting of the Council,⁴¹ added his support to Sergeev.⁴²

The work of ECOSOC received the endorsement of the U.S.S.R. Tarasenko for the Ukraine even urged that the body consider the rehabilitation of countries of Eastern Europe which had suffered from German invaders.⁴³ Sergeev also encouraged conferences, though he favored holding some on the Continent because so many had been held in the United Kingdom and the United States due to the war.⁴⁴ Sergeev expressed some doubt about relations with specialized international agencies, many of which had existed for some time, and some of which, as for example, the International Labor Office, had been at odds with, and was looked upon with suspicion by, the U.S.S.R. Sergeev hoped that relations with these agencies would be limited to an exchange of representatives, exchange of documentation, exchange of information and the presentation of recommendations when it seemed desirable.⁴⁵

Gromyko's speech in the General Assembly on January 18, 1946, reviewed his country's hopes and fears for the United Nations.⁴⁶ He restated Stalin's analysis, "It will be a new, special, fully authorized international Organization having at its command everything necessary to defend peace and prevent new aggression. Can we expect the actions of this world Organization to be sufficiently effective? They will be effective if the great powers which have borne on their shoulders the main burden of the war against Hitlerite Germany continue to act in a spirit of unanimity and accord. They will not be effective if this essential condition is violated." Gromyko warned that the revival of the methods applied in the League of Nations would cause nothing but harm to the United Nations Organization. He urged that the trusteeship system be put into effect with speed.

On Vyshinsky's arrival he spoke on the major question of the atomic bomb, and supported for the U.S.S.R. the resolution to establish a commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters.⁴⁷

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Activity of the U.S.S.R. in the Security Council has been dramatic, and because of this drama has been taken in some instances as the sole index of the Soviet Union's attitude toward the United Nations. It

41. *Id.* (Feb. 9, 1946) 56.

42. *Id.* (Feb. 15, 1946) 90.

43. *Id.* (Jan. 31, 1946) 27, 28.

44. *Id.* (Feb. 22, 1946) 107.

45. *Id.* (Feb. 7, 1946) 50.

46. JOURNAL OF THE GEN. ASSEMBLY (Jan. 19, 1946) 204-07.

47. *Id.* (Jan. 25, 1946) 296.

seems likely that the Soviet leaders plan their activity in all agencies to form a coordinated whole, and that attention to the Security Council alone may give a distorted view of Soviet policy to the outsider. With this cautionary comment, the work of the Soviet Union in the Security Council will be examined.

Gromyko opened his country's participation in the Security Council by stating, "I wish, in the name of the Soviet delegation, to express the hope that the Security Council will fulfill the great historic task which has been given it by the Charter of the United Nations."⁴⁸ The sessions began immediately with a presentation of the Iranian request for consideration of the presence of Soviet troops on its territory. It was followed immediately by the Soviet letter requesting a discussion of the presence of British troops in Greece⁴⁹ and the Ukrainian delegate's letter directing attention to the situation in Indonesia.⁵⁰ Vyshinsky filed a long response to the Iranian letter,⁵¹ and the debate which re-echoed in the Council throughout all of its first six months of activity began. This debate has since been mingled with others, such as the debates over Lebanon and Syria and finally Spain, but it has been taken by many observers as the issue of primary importance in assessing Soviet participation in the United Nations. This is probably overemphasis, in view of the peculiar history of the area.

The debates over the issues concerning Iran, Greece, Indonesia, Lebanon, Syria and Spain have indicated the thinking of the various powers as to how the Security Council should operate. The major issue to emerge has been the question of the veto. The U.S.S.R. has shown itself determined to maintain the position it expressed when the United Nations was being formed.

Vyshinsky recognized the right of any member of the United Nations to be heard in the Security Council,⁵² but if a decision were required, he insisted upon unanimity of the permanent members, even on the question of whether the matter was one of procedure or substance.⁵³ As to what was a matter of procedure he stated, "I submit that procedural questions are questions of the order in which, or the methods by which, the business of an organ is conducted. The question of whether a case

48. JOURNAL OF THE SEC. COUNCIL (Jan. 18, 1946) 7.

49. *Id.* (Jan. 24, 1946) 14.

50. *Id.* (Jan. 24, 1946) 15.

51. *Id.* (Jan. 26, 1946) 17-19.

52. *Id.* (Jan. 26, 1946) 24-25.

53. "... [B]ut, even if it were possible to envisage this as a question of procedure, according to the rules set forth at the San Francisco Conference, a decision as to whether this is a question of procedure or not can be reached only through unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council. In both cases the necessary condition of the decision is that it should be unanimous among the permanent members of the Security Council." A. Y. Vyshinsky in JOURNAL OF THE SEC. COUNCIL (Feb. 9, 1946) 134.

constitutes a situation or a dispute is a question of substance and not of procedure, and so any decision on such a question would have to be taken not under paragraph 2 of Article 27, but under paragraph 3 of Article 27." ⁵⁴ The U.S.S.R. has used its right of veto on several occasions, and at one time vetoed a proposed resolution which would have amounted to censure of other of the permanent members of the Security Council against whom it had spoken, because the resolution did not go far enough. ⁵⁵

Support of the case of dependent peoples has proved to be a matter of considerable interest to the U.S.S.R. in meetings of the Security Council. An outstanding case was a long speech by Vyshinsky in favor of the application of Lebanon and Syria for relief against the continued presence of British and French troops. ⁵⁶ Efforts have also been made since the earliest meetings of the Security Council to obtain the admission of Albania ⁵⁷ to the United Nations. Vyshinsky opposed Stettinius' proposal that the application of Albania be held until all applications were considered, on the ground that there was no reason to link the admission of a qualified country with the admission of another country. ⁵⁸ The U.S.S.R. was not, apparently, prepared to reach bargains on admissions.

The U.S.S.R. has indicated that it favors admitting more members, for its delegate has said, "We do not wish to turn the United Nations into a narrow sectarian organization. Indeed that would be impossible for we are already fifty-one states. Let us do all we can do to widen this Organization." ⁵⁹ On the other hand, the U.S.S.R. wishes to have a prominent voice in admissions. Gromyko has insisted, over the recommendation of Australia to the contrary, that admission cannot be voted by the General Assembly until after the Security Council has recommended the candidate. ⁶⁰ The U.S.S.R. is apparently seeking to avoid any possibility of a repetition of the Argentine case.

The U.S.S.R. also participates in the other agencies of the United Nations. Vyshinsky reported to the Security Council that the Soviet representatives on the Military Staff Committee were Lieutenant General A. F. Vasiliev, Vice-Admiral B. L. Bogdenko and Major General (Aviation) A. R. Sharapov. ⁶¹ The U.S.S.R. nominated two of its

54. *Id.* (Feb. 21, 1946) 273. Also "The position seems to me to be very clear because no matter of procedure can call for an action, for a decision." A. Y. Vyshinsky in *id.* (Feb. 9, 1946) 135.

55. As in Syria and Lebanon case. *Id.* (Mar. 1, 1946) 347.

56. *Id.* (Mar. 1, 1946) 292-298.

57. *Id.* (Jan. 26, 1946) 26.

58. *Id.* (Jan. 30, 1946) 42.

59. *Id.* (Feb. 20, 1946) 259.

60. *Id.* (May 23, 1946) 678-79.

61. *Id.* (Jan. 26, 1946) 19.

most eminent Professors of Law as candidates for election to the International Court of Justice, Professors S. B. Krylov and I. S. Peretersky. The first named was elected to the Court.⁶²

A clue as to what the U.S.S.R. thought of the First Session of the United Nations may be found in the text of a letter from London published by *New Times*.⁶³ Criticism was leveled at the procedure followed in the election of the President of the Assembly, particularly in that Spaak who had not even been nominated was elected. He was criticized for his support of Belgian neutrality during the period of 1936-39 on the ground that this facilitated the execution of certain Hitlerite plans. The whole session was seen as an attempt to push the Soviet Union into the background and to prevent it from playing the same role in questions of peace and the peace settlement as it had played in achieving victory. The meetings were thought reminiscent in many ways of the atmosphere at Geneva, but with certain changes, notably in the positions of the U.S.S.R. and France, and the presence of the United States. There was detected in the speeches of some of the United States delegates a note which harmonizes little with the principle of equality between all the members of the United Nations. Warning was given that if this fact indicated a tendency to occupy a domineering position in the United Nations, it would undoubtedly encounter due and legitimate opposition.

A further clue as to what especially interested the U.S.S.R. in the United Nations is to be found in a lecture by Professor Boris Stein, who has been active in the Security Council. In reporting in Moscow on March 1, 1946⁶⁴ he emphasized particularly the activities of the U.S.S.R. in seeking early transfer of League of Nations mandates to the United Nations so that they might be administered by the Trusteeship Council. He criticized South Africa for wanting to unite South West Africa to the Union of South Africa rather than to transfer it to trusteeship. He implied that the French and British Governments were trying various measures to avoid transfer of any but relatively unimportant areas, and of hedging the transfer of even such areas with conditions.

Professor Stein also considered in some detail the application of the World Trade Union Federation for representation in the United Nations. He gave particular attention to the fact that, in the Subcommittee appointed to consider the Federation's application, there were four representatives of Socialist Parties—Spaak (Belgium), Paul-Boncour (France), Noel Baker (United Kingdom), and Fraser (New Zealand), who opposed the working class organization, while the prin-

62. *Id.* (Feb. 12, 1946) 146.

63. *NEW TIMES* (Mar. 1, 1946) 19.

64. *TRUD* (Mar. 10, 1946).

cial supporter was the Ukrainian delegate, Manuilsky. He criticized the British Government for its attitude on Greece, Indonesia, Syria and Lebanon, while praising Soviet support of their cases. No reference to Iran is recorded. The speech makes clear that the value of the United Nations as a tribune for Soviet thought on dependent areas is appreciated by the U.S.S.R. as one of its principal attributes.

SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

The U.S.S.R. has always carefully scrutinized a specialized international agency before accepting an invitation to join. Soviet leaders join only those organizations which are necessary to further Soviet relations with the rest of the world on a basis which is deemed desirable. Organizations are never joined merely in order to belong while awaiting further developments which will indicate the function of the organization.

During the war the U.S.S.R. participated in conferences and organizations designed to win the war and some designed to provide for orderly transitions to peace. Its delegates sat in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and two of its republics sought considerable aid from that organization. Its delegates took part in the European Inland Transport Organization, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, the European Advisory Commission and the Allied Advisory Council for Italy. Its delegates indicated wartime unity with its other allies in attending the Bretton Woods Conference to establish an International Bank and Fund, although the U.S.S.R. has not ratified the Convention since the end of the war.

Since the war it has participated in the International Military Tribunal trying the German leaders at Nuremberg and its counterpart in Tokyo. It has joined the Far Eastern Commission, although it delayed entrance until after its war with Japan and until terms of reference seemed suitable. It has been much more cautious about participation in specialized agencies of an economic and social type, as for example the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe, the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization, the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe, and the European Coal Organization.

The pattern has been such as to indicate that political agencies are usually supported, while economic and social ones are viewed with caution. It may be that this situation results from the fact that the economic and social agencies usually provide for investigative powers which would take them into the Soviet Union as well as into the territories of other members to determine or verify the facts requisite to operation. Suspicion that such organizations might go beyond their

functions and become media of international espionage, or make available to the world information of an economic and social nature which the U.S.S.R. considers vital to its security, may play more of a part in the decision of Soviet leaders than the Western World imagines. Soviet leaders have learned from experience that Hitler failed, in part, because of his lack of correct information on Soviet resources and social conditions. The world will have to demonstrate to the satisfaction of Soviet leaders that new wars will not be directed against the U.S.S.R. before one can expect the U.S.S.R. to open its economy to examination. The suspicion born of the Russian heritage and political philosophy, which has already been discussed, will retard acceptance of any such movement even if its peaceful nature is so clear to the Western World as to make Soviet reluctance to share in specialized agencies appear to be evidence of hostility.

WORLD GOVERNMENT

Soviet activity in the United Nations has evidenced Soviet mistrust of efforts at world government. Soviet statesmen have constantly emphasized the desirability of retaining full sovereignty for participating nations. Compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice has been opposed. The importance of the veto has been emphasized on every occasion. The Soviet delegate withdrew from discussions on Iran when his Government decided they had become hypocritical and maneuvers of power politics of the League of Nations type.

Soviet political theory would not support a conception of world government as long as the capitalist system survives. Wars may be postponed by a United Nations organization, but they cannot, in Soviet eyes, be prevented forever. Stalin has restated the well-known Marxist thesis that capitalism breeds wars. Hopes for a world government which can eliminate a phenomenon which grows out of the operation of economic forces are believed unfounded by Soviet theorists.

World government of a different type from that currently envisaged by many groups in the United States is not a dream to Soviet theorists, however. It was the ultimate aim of the Communist International. It rests upon the Soviet belief that if the peoples of the world were to embrace socialism of the Soviet type, friction caused by competing economic forces would be eliminated and those forces harnessed through planning to the advantage of all peoples. Culture of individual national groups would be preserved and even fostered through an expansion of the Soviet system of federation. The world would become a super Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and ultimately the state apparatus, as a mechanism for compulsion, would "wither away." There would remain only a planning and administrative apparatus. Such a program is far in the back of Soviet minds, for its realization is remote. It is no longer stated on frequent occasions, as it was when

the Communist International was a youthful organization. Attention is now centered upon the concrete task of assuring an era of peace to the U.S.S.R. in which it can heal the wounds of over 7,000,000 killed, of 25,000,000 homeless, of destruction of basic industries, mines and transportation, and of devastation on the farms of the western republics.

If the United Nations continues to give promise that it can prevent an attack upon the armed forces of the U.S.S.R., it will undoubtedly retain the U.S.S.R. as a member, but as a member always on the alert. The U.S.S.R. will leave no stone unturned to avoid decisions which would, in effect, place other great powers in dominating positions in the zones of the Far East, the Middle East and Eastern Europe which have become associated in Soviet minds with security concepts of defense in depth. At the same time, the U.S.S.R. will probably continue to value the United Nations as a meeting ground and as a tribune from which it may press for causes which appeal to dependent and laboring peoples, particularly if those peoples find only opposition to their aspirations among any or all of the other great powers. As of the spring of 1946 the U.S.S.R. seemed dissatisfied with events in the United Nations,⁶⁵ but it appeared to be prepared to continue membership as a line of defense and as a tribune for its ideas.

65. Speech of Ambassador Gromyko in Madison Square Garden, as reported in *N. Y. Times*, May 30, 1946, p. 1, col. 3, in which he declared that he found "a tendency on the part of certain countries to play a dominating part to the detriment of the cause of peace and security." He thought that "this tendency may cause serious and irreparable harm to all the activities of the United Nations and, consequently, to the whole cause of peace and security."